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ABSTRACT
Societies are complex. Properties of social systems can be explained by the interplay and weaving of individual actions.
Incentives are key to understand people’s choices and decisions. For instance, individual preferences of where to live may lead
to the emergence of social segregation. In this paper, we combine Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Agent Based Models
(ABM) in order to address the self-organizing dynamics of social segregation and explore the space of possibilities that emerge
from considering different types of incentives. Our model promotes the creation of interdependencies and interactions among
multiple agents of two different kinds that want to segregate from each other. For this purpose, agents use Deep Q-Networks to
make decisions based on the rules of the Schelling Segregation model and the Predator-Prey model. Despite the segregation
incentive, our experiments show that spatial integration can be achieved by establishing interdependencies among agents
of different kinds. They also reveal that segregated areas are more probable to host older people than diverse areas, which
attract younger ones. Through this work, we show that the combination of RL and ABMs can create an artificial environment for
policy makers to observe potential and existing behaviors associated to incentives.
1 Introduction
The recent availability of large datasets collected from various resources, such as digital transactions, location data and
government census, is transforming the ways we study and understand social systems1. Researchers and policy makers are
able to observe and model social interactions and dynamics in great detail, including the structure of friendship networks2,
the behavior of cities3, politically polarized societies4, or the spread of information on social media5. These studies show the
behaviors present in the data but do not explore the space of possibilities that human dynamics may evolve to. Robust policies
should consider mechanisms to respond to every type of events6, including those that are very rare7. Therefore it is crucial to
develop simulation environments such that potentially unobserved social dynamics can be assessed empirically.
Agent Based Modeling (ABM) is a generative approach to study social phenomena based on the interaction of individuals8.
These models show how different types of individual behavior give rise to emergent macroscopic regularities9, such as unequal
wealth distributions10, new political actors11, multipolarity in interstate systems12 and cultural differentiation13. Moreover,
ABM allows testing core sociological theories against simulations10 with emphasis on heterogeneous, autonomous actors with
bounded, spatial information14. However, the rules of agent interactions are generally fixed which limits the exploration of the
space of possible behaviors.
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a simulation method where agents become intelligent and create new, optimal behaviors
based on the state of their environment and a previously defined structure of incentives. This method is referred as Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning (MARL) if multiple agents are employed. Recently, the combination of RL with Deep Learning
architectures achieve human level performance in complex tasks, including video gaming15, motion in harsh environments16,
and effective communication networks without assumptions17. Moreover, it has been recently applied to study societal dilemma
and game theory problems18 such as the emergence of cooperation19, 20, the Prisoner’s Dilemma21 and payoff matrices in
equilibrium22. Although Deep RL algorithms applied to multiple agents (MARL) can shed light on social phenomena, to the
best of our knowledge, the applications of these methods has been confined to classical game-theoretic problems23 and drawing
connections to real-world examples remains unexplored.
In this paper we extend the standard ABM of social segregation using MARL in order to explore the space of possible
behaviors as we modify the structure of incentives and promote the interaction among agents of different kinds. The idea
is to observe the behavior of agents that want to segregate from each other when interactions are promoted. We achieve the
segregation dynamics by considering the rules from the Schelling model9. The creation of interdependencies among agents of
different kinds is inspired by the dynamics of the Predator-Prey model8 where agents hunt each other. Our experiments show
that spatial segregation diminishes as more interdependencies among agents of different kinds are added. Moreover, our results
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Table 1. Training parameters of the Deep Q-Networks used during the experiments.
PARAMETER VALUE
NUMBER OF EPISODES 1
BATCH SIZE 256
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 5000
NUMBER OF TRAINING STEPS 60.000
EXPERIENCE MEMORY LENGTH 1.000.000
DISCOUNT FACTOR (γ ) 0.98
LEARNING RATE 0.001
MOMENTUM 0.999
DOUBLE NETWORK COPY PARAMETER (τ ) 0.05
INITIAL EXPLORATION RATE 0.999
FINAL EXPLORATION RATE 0
EXPLORATION DECAY (PER AGENT ACTION) 100.000
shed light on previously unknown behaviors regarding segregation and the age of individuals which we confirmed using Census
data. These methods can be extended to study other type of social phenomena and inform policy makers on possible actions.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we explain the experimental setup. Section 3 illustrates the
experiment outcomes. In Section 4 we conclude and discuss our results. Future improvements are presented in Section S1 in
the Supplement.
2 Methods
We design a game in which agents are promoted to both self-segregate and interact with others. By varying the reward of
interactions we are able to explore different incentives that affect the self-organizing process of segregation. Our experiments
are based on two types of agents: A and B. Agents try to survive in a 50x50 grid where they can move around and interact with
other agents. They observe an 11x11 patch of the grid centered around their current position and can live for a total of 100
iterations in isolation. Figure 1 shows an schematic view of the grid world and the agents. Distinct colors indicate the agents’
types and the green square represents the observation window of the agent illustrated in green.
Each type of agent utilizes one Deep Q-Network for maximizing rewards15. The rewards of the game, R, are as following:
• Segregation reward. This incentive promotes agents to self-segregate. An agent is rewarded +1 for each agent of similar
kind that joins its observation window, and -1 for each agent of different kind.
• Interdependence reward. This incentive promotes interactions among agents of different kinds. When an agent meets
another agent of different kind, we randomly choose a winner of the interaction (following hunting dynamics). The
winner (hunter) receives a positive reward, that we vary across experiments, and an extension of its lifetime by one
iteration.
• Vigilance reward. This incentive promotes agents to stay alive by providing +0.1 reward for every time step they
survive.
• Death reward. This incentive rewards negatively agents who die or are hunted by agents of opposite kind. Agents
receive -1 reward when they die.
• Occlusion reward. This incentive rewards movements towards occupied cells negatively. If an agent tries to move
towards an occluded area, the agent receives -1 reward.
• Stillness reward. This incentive promotes the exploration of space. Agents who choose to stay still receive -1 reward.
Every agent takes one action at each iteration. The sequence of agents who take actions is chosen randomly. There are five
possible actions for agents: to stay still or to move left, right, up or down. Agents are confined to the borders of the grid and
cannot move towards agents of their own kind. If an agent moves to a location occupied by an agent of the opposite kind, it
receives the interdependence reward and the opponent receives the death reward.
Mathematically, agents of type A are represented as −1, B as +1, empty space as 0 and border as −2 on the grid.
Hence every agent’s spatial observation at time t is O(i)spatial,t ∈ P11x11 | P ∈ {−2,−1,0,1}. Moreover, every agent has the
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Figure 1. Schematic of the model simulation and network architecture. Top panel: Grid world of experiments. The grid size is
50x50 locations. Red and blue squares denote two types of agents respectively. White represents empty regions. Each type has
its own Deep Q-Network. Every agent has a field of view of 11x11 locations. Green border denotes the field of view of the
agent illustrated in green. Agents can move across empty spaces. Bottom panel: Network structure of φA and φB. Each network
receives an input of 11x11 locations, runs it through five convolution steps and concatenates the resulting activations with the
agent’s remaining age normalized by the maximum initial age. The feature vector is mapped over the action space using a fully
connected layer. The action with the maximum Q-value is taken for the agent.
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Figure 2. Agents collective behavior for multiple values of interdependence reward (rows) at multiple times (columns). Rows
represent outcomes associated to different values of the interdependence reward (IR). Columns show the state of the system at
different points of the simulation. Experiments are initialized with equal initial conditions and random seed. The heat maps are
obtained by averaging over the last 1000 iterations. In Panel (a) red regions denote biased occupation of type A agents where
areas fully occupied with type A agents are indicated by type concentration of +1. Blue regions denote biased occupation of
type B agents where full occupation of blues are indicated by type concentration of -1. White areas indicate uniform mixing
across types, indicated by type concentration of 0. In Panel (b) color indicates the age of agents irrespective of their type. As
color shades from blue to red agent age increases. In Section 3, we introduce a set of videos that represent the experiments used
in creating the heat maps.
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Figure 3. Segregation dynamics for multiple values of interdependence reward (IR). Colors correspond to the results for
multiple values of interdependence reward, ranging from yellow (low) to black (high). The curves are obtained by averaging 50
iterations over 10 experiment realizations. Shades denote the standard deviation across experiments.
information of its remaining normalized life time, represented as O(i)age,t ∈ R. Full observation of the agent i at time t is
oit ∈ O(i)t = O(i)spatial,t ∪O(i)age,t . Let φA and φB denote the Q-Networks of type A and B. Then the networks’ goal is to satisfy
Equations 1 and 2.
φ ∗A = argmaxφA
E[
T
∑
t=0
NA
∑
i=1
γ tr(i)t |o(i)t ] (1)
φ ∗B = argmaxφB
E[
T
∑
t=0
NB
∑
i=1
γ tr(i)t |o(i)t ] (2)
where NX denotes the number of agents of type X , γ denotes the discount factor, rt denotes the reward at time t and QφX (.)
denotes the Q-Network of agents of type X .
Each network is initialized with the same parameters. In order to homogenize the networks’ inputs, we normalize the
observation windows by the agents’ own kind, such that positive and negative values respectively represent equal and opposite
kind for each agent. Actions are taken by following ε-Greedy exploration strategy. Exploration rate decays exponentially. In
order to stabilize the learning process, we use Adam optimizer24, Experience Replay25 and Double Q-Learning26. Networks
are trained in parallel over 12 CPUs using data parallelism. We run one episode per experiment. Each episode is comprised of
5000 iterations. Each experiment is repeated 10 times for statistical analysis. Network details are given in Figure 1 (bottom)
and training details are given in Table 1.
3 Results
Experiments are conducted by setting up different values of incentives and observing the emergent collective behavior associated
with each experiment. During simulations, agents explore the space of possible behaviors and inform which behaviors are
promoted under certain incentives and environmental rules. As a result, we create an artificial environment for testing hypotheses
and obtaining information through simulations hard to anticipate given the complexity of the space of possibilities.1
In this case, we create agents who want to segregate from other kinds and provide incentives to create interactions and
interdependencies across kinds. For this purpose, we model the Schelling dynamics for segregation and combine it with the
interdependence reward. The interdependence reward is given when agents of different kinds compete and win against each
other following hunting dynamics. The one who is hunted dies and the hunter gets a positive reward and life-extension. In total,
there are four different experiments with interdependence reward of 0, 25, 50 and 75 respectively. A set of videos are available
1Demonstration of the experiments: (IR: 0) https://youtu.be/AgAeYMe2tUE (IR: 25) https://youtu.be/OZbl8qD50Mg (IR: 50) https:
//youtu.be/Ca2p2cATmlw (IR: 75) https://youtu.be/R32Xu_EUpBQ.
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Figure 4. Dynamics of the experiment results. Panel (a) shows the average age of agents. Panel (b) shows the maximum age
of agents. Panel (c) shows the percentage of agents that hunt at each iteration. Panel (d) shows the hunters’ cluster size prior to
hunting the opposing agent. Panel (e) shows the age of the agents hunting. Color is proportional to the interdependence reward
(IR). Darker color indicates higher interdependence reward. Each plot is obtained by averaging results of ten experiments and
100 iterations. Shaded areas denote the standard deviation among the experiments.
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with one simulation for each setting. In the videos, colors yellow/orange and cyan/magenta denote the types of agents. The
color brightness indicates the age of agents for both kinds.
Interdependence rewards diminish spatial segregation among different types. In Figure 2a we show the collective behavior
of the population, using heat maps proportional to the probability of agents location during simulations according to their type.
The heat maps are visualized over one trial of the experiments. Blue and red regions show biases towards each kind. White
regions show uniform occupation. The dynamics of segregation quickly result in patches of segregated groups (top panels). As
interdependence rewards increase, the probability of one grid being occupied by agent of type A or B becomes uniform and
plots become white (bottom right panels). By creating interdependencies among agents, they increase their interactions and
reduce the spatial segregation.
We measure segregation among agents using multiscale entropy. We convolve the grid space with low pass filters of size
6x6, 12x12 and 25x25 using sliding windows whose output is the window average value. We measure the entropy of the
distribution of window averages after each convolution across all iterations. The segregation per iteration is defined as the
average entropy across the distributions resulting from the different filter sizes. The resulting segregation dynamics is visualized
in Figure 3. Segregation is high when interdependencies are not rewarded (yellow curve). As interdependencies increase
(purple and black curves), the agents mix and the spatial segregation is significantly reduced (p < 0.001, see Section S2 in the
Supplement).
Interdependencies affect the group dynamics. As we increase the reward for interdependencies, the initially stable patches
emerging from promoting segregation become dynamic and mix with the other kind. The properties of the population and
associated activities reflect the change of dynamics. Agents create an internal hierarchy where younger agents go out and hunt
and elder agents segregate and ensure reproduction. Evidences of such behavior are that the average age of agents decreases
and the hunting rate increases (Figure 4a and 4c) and average hunter age is much lower than the average agent age (Figure 4a
and 4e). Moreover, the maximum age of agents per kind increases (Figure 4b) showing that some agents stay protected and do
not hunt. The hunting strategy of agents is also affected by increasing interdependencies. Pack size increases consistently with
interdependence rewards. Figure 4d shows the size of hunting clusters one step before hunting an agent. The increasing cluster
size given interdependence rewards suggests that agent association yields better results. It also shows that hostile systems favor
agglomeration of agents for safety which can result in ultimate polarization. Additionally, we also analyzed the effects of the
vigilance rewards on the dynamics for multiple reward values. Results show that higher vigilance reward increases intra-kind
interaction and results in more segregation (see Section S3).
Diverse areas attract younger people and people are older in segregated areas. We show that older agents are more segregated
than younger ones in the model (see Figure 2b). The behavior has been observed in the model and verified with human behavior
using Census data. We analyzed the relationship between age and segregation using Census data across the whole US (see
Section S4). A segregation metric based on racial entropy correlated positively with median age by census tract (r=0.4). Our
simulation shed light on an observation that is not trivial about current societies.
In summary, our experiments show that increasing interdependencies among kinds can be applied to reduce segregation.
Moreover, hostile interdependencies will result in in-group cooperation for hunting and competition for sheltering. The
emergent behavior of the population can be framed in the exploiter and explorer discussion. A part of it chooses to segregate
and another one to go out and explore. The one who explores hunts and is vulnerable to be hunted, but creates spatial integration.
The one who segregates lives longer and ensures reproduction of its own kind. In this model, explorers tend to be younger
and keepers tend to live longer. Spatial mixing was achieved by increasing interaction rewards but was accompanied by larger
clusters of agents of the same size. Polarization may arise when there is an adversarial relationship between the parts that
segregate from each other. More generally, emergent behaviors lie in a non-linear space where interaction properties determine
outcomes which may happen simultaneously and in different combinations.
4 Discussion
We created an artificial environment for testing rules of interactions and incentives by observing the behaviors that emerge when
applied to multi-agent populations. Incentives can generate surprising behaviors because of the complexity of social systems.
As problems become complex, evolutionary computing is necessary to achieve sustainable solutions. We combine system
modeling (ABMs) with artificial intelligence (RL) in order to explore the space of solutions associated to promoted incentives.
RL provides ABMs the information processing capabilities that enables the exploration of strategies that satisfy the conditions
imposed by the interaction rule. In turn, ABMs provide RL with access to models of collective behavior that achieve emergence
and complexity. While ABMs provide access to the complexity of the problem space, RL facilitates the exploration of the
solution space. Our methodology opens a new avenue for policy makers to design and test incentives in artificial environments.
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Supplement
S1 Future Work
There are many potential improvements to our work. We classify directions of future work under three categories: representation,
training and experimentation. Our method can be advanced by representing agents more realistically such as introducing
heterogeneous personalities to agents or facilitating network structure over agents to promote alliances. Moreover, training RL
agents yield better results with sophisticated exploration strategies27–29. In addition to exploration strategies, MARL is shown
to perform better with curriculum learning30. Our aim is to extend the work on multi agent curriculum learning to our problem.
Schelling and Predator - Prey models cover just a little portion of the ABM domain31. We are currently working on
extending this artificial environment to other ABMs, i.e. Axelrod model13. Our goal is to develop an easy interface where
policy makers and AI researchers can collaborate on solving societal problems.
S2 Statistical Significance
We validate the significance of the patterns we observe along the execution of the simulation as we change the IR incentive
in Figure 3. We analyze the distribution of values across the last 1000 interactions for each IR values and test the difference
among their averages. In Table S1 we summarize the results of the statistical tests. The differences in averages are statistically
significant (p < 0.001) across all pairs of curves.
S3 Vigilance Reward
We analyze the effects of the Vigilance Rewards (VR) on the dynamics of agents. In Figures S1 and S2 we the impact on
segregation and age distribution for multiple values of VR. The results show that increased VR increases intra-kind behavior
and as a results increases segregation. Therefore, segregation may also be fostered by other types of behaviors.
S4 Agents Age
We analyze the significance of the spatial distribution of agent ages shown in Figure 2b. In Figure S3 we show the entropy of the
spatial distribution of agent ages at multiple iteration times and interdependence reward (IR), together with a randomized case
for comparison. The randomized case is constructed by drawing agent ages on the grid from a uniform distribution between (0,
1) and calculating the entropy. The difference between the random case and the empirical results is significant in all cases. We
tested significance by comparing each curve. A summary of the test results are presented in Table S2.
The behavior has been observed in the model and verified it with human behavior using Census data. We analyzed the
relationship between age and segregation using Census data across the whole US. A segregation metric based on racial entropy
correlated positively with median age by census tract (r=0.4). In Figure S4 we present a scatter plot of the segregation metric
(x-axis) and average age (y-axis) of each census tract (dots).
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R1 R2 t-value p-value
0 25 4.373 6.44e-06
0 50 15.935 0.0
0 75 23.890 0.0
25 0 -4.373 6.44e-06
25 50 11.267 0.0
25 75 20.331 0.0
50 0 -15.925 0.0
50 25 -11.267 0.0
50 75 11.691 0.0
75 0 -23.890 0.0
75 25 -20.331 0.0
75 50 -11.691 0.0
Table S1. Statistical tests results comparing segregation outcomes for different values of Interdependence Reward denoted as
R1 and R2. We tested the difference in segregation over the last 1000 iterations for every pair of curves. The tests show that the
average segregation differs across curves of different rewards.
Figure S1. Spatial distribution of agent types with varying Vigilance Reward (VR) (vertical) and Iteration (horizontal). Color
indicates concentration of each type.
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Figure S2. Spatial distribution of agent ages with varying Vigilance Reward (VR) (vertical) and Iteration (horizontal).
Figure S3. Entropy of Spatial distribution of agent ages with iteration. Random case is constructed by drawing agent ages on
the grid from a uniform distribution and calculating the entropy. The difference in entropy corresponds to spatial clustering of
ages. Entropy is normalized by the logarithm of the grid size.
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V1 V2 t-value p-value
Random IR: 75 18.755 0.0
Random IR: 50 17.105 0.0
Random IR: 25 16.347 0.0
Random IR: 0 15.665 0.0
IR: 75 Random -18.755 0.0
IR: 75 IR: 50 2.676 0.010
IR: 75 IR: 25 3.772 0.0
IR: 75 IR: 0 3.520 0.001
IR: 50 Random -17.105 0.0
IR: 50 IR: 75 -2.676 0.010
IR: 50 IR: 25 1.214 0.231
IR: 50 IR: 0 1.039 0.304
IR: 25 Random -16.347 0.0
IR: 25 IR: 75 -3.772 0.0
IR: 25 IR: 50 -1.214 0.231
IR: 25 IR: 0 -0.144 0.886
IR: 0 Random -15.665 0.0
IR: 0 IR: 75 -3.521 0.001
IR: 0 IR: 50 -1.039 0.304
IR: 0 IR: 25 0.144 0.886
Table S2. Statistical significance of comparing the average age entropy for different Interdependence Reward, denoted by V1
and V2. Random curves are denoted by sampling entropy value per iteration from a uniform distribution between zero and one.
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Figure S4. Age and racial segregation by census tract (dots). Pearson correlation r annotated in the Figure.
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